บทความชิ้นนี้เขียนเมื่อ ค.ศ. 2003 ข้อมูลบางส่วนจึงอาจเปลี่ยนแปลงไปแล้ว
Taiwan’s Attempts to Overcome International Isolation: Success and Failure
The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has been known since the late 1970s as ‘an economic giant, a diplomatic orphan’ because as its economy has grown, it has been diplomatically isolated by international community. As a result, the ROC government tried to overcome international isolation by declaring ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ in 1988. This article argues that pragmatic diplomacy has been partly successful in terms of making other countries acknowledge that Taiwan is a political entity and has a juridical capacity to be a state according to the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933. However, pragmatic diplomacy cannot make most countries that realise the PRC political and economic might accept Taiwan as an independent state.
Facing international isolation since the PRC admission to the United Nations in 1971 and the establishment of the U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations in 1979, the ROC government on Taiwan has tried to overcome the isolation. The 1973 declaration of ‘total diplomacy’[1] by then Premier Chiang Ching-guo became the foundation of ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ or ‘flexible diplomacy’ launched by then President Lee Teng-hui in 1988 that called for:
1. The advancement and reinforcement of formal diplomatic ties
2. The development of substantive relations with countries that do not maintain formal ties with Taiwan.
3. Admission or readmission to international organisations and activities vital to the country’s national interest.[2]
These three principles declared by Lee Teng-hui will be used in this article as criteria for assessing, first, the success and, later, the failure of Taiwan’s pragmatic or flexible diplomacy.
The success of pragmatic diplomacy
Considering the advancement and reinforcement of formal diplomatic ties, the ROC tries to use its economic might to sustain relations and gain recognition by giving economic aid to countries that have diplomatic relations with her. Most of these countries are developing countries in Central America, Africa, and Oceania which are attracted by the ROC ‘dollar diplomacy’. In addition, the ROC in the late 1980s decided that it no longer considers the battle with the PRC over diplomatic recognition as a zero-sum game. Therefore, it gave up the application of the ‘Hallstein Doctrine’[3] and accept a dual recognition by establishing its diplomatic relations with Grenada, a state that still maintained official ties with Beijing in 1988.[4] As then ROC foreign minister Federick Chien stated in 1992:
"…in China, there now exist two political entities—one mainland China and one Republic of China on Taiwan. And that is really the theoretical basis of pragmatic diplomacy. Within the nation of China, there two political entities and each entity should have the capability of conducting its own diplomacy. They should, each one, have its own place in the world community."[5]
Dollar diplomacy has been partly successful. The number of countries that recognise the ROC has increased from 21 countries in the late 1970s to 27 countries by 2003.[6] Although this is a small victory, it is important for the international status and statehood of the ROC. According to article 1 of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933,[7] four qualifications of the state as a person of international law are (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) government; and (4) capacity to enter relations with other states. Using the Convention as criteria, the ROC can be a state in both Declaratory School, which argues that any entity that possesses all elements of a state is a state[8] and Constitutive School, which argues that such entity must be recognised by other states to qualify as a state,[9] because it has a permanent population of 22,749,838 million[10] who live in four islands, namely Formosa, the Pescadores, Mazu, and Jinmen, with the total area of 35,980 sq. km.[11] under the rule of the government at Taipei which has official ties and is recognised by 27 countries. In short, the ROC official relations with these countries, and also unofficial ties that will be mentioned later, imply that her capacity to be a state is present.
In respect of the development of substantive relations with countries that do not maintain formal ties with Taiwan, although the ROC has official relations with only 27 countries, it maintains economic, technological, and cultural relations with countries around the world. By 2003, the ROC has 90 representative offices, or virtual embassies, under the guise of various names in 58 countries and territories and, reciprocally, 46 countries that do not have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan have established 54 representative offices or visa issuing centres in Taiwan which implies that these countries recognise the ROC as a political entity in international arena.[12] In Europe, the EU Parliament and 18 European parliaments have established inter-parliamentary friendship groups with Taiwan’s parliament.[13] In order to strengthen relations, the ROC uses the so-called ‘vacation diplomacy’ in which senior ROC political leaders would travel to foreign countries and meet with foreign leaders under the guise of unofficial vacation trips. In addition, the treatment Taiwan receives from these countries implies that they accept Taiwan as a political entity, as proved by considering Taiwan’s substantial relations with two countries and one region, namely the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia.
For the ROC, the United States is important in terms of security and economy. Strategically, although the Cold War in Asia had ended in the mid-1970s and the United States severed its official ties with the ROC in December 1978, the United States is still Taiwan’s security guarantor under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act that obliges the U.S. to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability”.[14] Economically, bilateral trade volume between these two countries in 2000 was $59.9 billion, making Taiwan the seventh largest importer of U.S. products and its eighth largest trading partner overall.[15] The United States in 2000 and 2001 was also the second largest recipient of Taiwan’s outbound investment[16] and the second biggest export market of Taiwan’s goods.[17] Economic interests with Taiwan gave rise to the pro-Taiwan group in the Congress that pressures the government to upgrade existing ties with the ROC. The extent of its success has been seen since the early 1990s. The visit of then U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills in December 1992 became the first time that a cabinet-level official had visited Taiwan since 1979.[18] In April 1994, the House 369-0 and the Senate 97-1 votes to urge the Clinton administration to grant a visa to then President Lee Teng-hui to conduct his vacation diplomacy under the guise of visiting his alma mater, Cornell University.[19] In September 1994, Washington allowed Taipei to change the name of its virtual embassy from the Coordinating Council for North American Affairs to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office,[20] a name that gives a clue to the identity of the country it represents. American economic interests in the ROC spill over into enhancing Taiwan’s security. After debates on U.S. Taiwan policy in Republican Party during the 2000 presidential campaign, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in his testimony in 2001 confirmed that the “Six Assurances”[21], first outlined by the Reagan Administration in 1982, remain part of U.S. Taiwan policy.[22] President George W. Bush also exhibited his resolve to abide by the Taiwan Relations Act by stating that the U.S. will “help Taiwan defend herself”[23] and agreeing to sell Taiwan guided-missile destroyers, diesel powered submarines, and anti-submarine aircrafts.[24] In short, the visit by the U.S. cabinet-level official, the allowance for the ROC to change the name of the office in the United States, the issue of visa for Lee Teng-hui, though under Congressional pressure, and the confirmation of the “Six Assurances” by Colin Powell enhance the ROC security and status as a political entity, facilitate the ROC conduct of vacation diplomacy, and show Taiwan’s capability to conduct its own foreign relations, one of the four qualifications of the state according to the Montevideo Convention of 1933.
Japan is also important for Taiwan’s efforts to implement pragmatic diplomacy and expand its international space. Although, it cannot substantially offer Taiwan defense and foreign policy support, due to the postwar constraints and lack of official ties since 1972, and it is Taiwan’s rival for investment in China and Southeast Asia, Japan in 2002 is Taiwan’s largest imports partner and third largest exports partner[25] and a source of technological skills, capital goods, and intermediate products that is essential for Taiwan’s export industry.[26] Lee Teng-hui’s proficiency in Japanese led to the cultivation of his relationship with many Japanese and economic interests continues to solidify this connection. In May 1992, the Japanese government allowed Taiwan to change the name of its office in Japan from the Association of East Asian Relations to the Economic and Cultural Representative Office of Taipei,[27] giving a clue to the identity of the country. In 1994, then Vice-Premier Hsu Li-teh was the ROC highest ranking official who was invited by the Japanese government to attend the 12th Asian Games in Hiroshima.[28] The following year Ryutaro Hashimoto, the then Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry met his Taiwanese counterpart Chiang Ping-kun on an official basis.[29] The treatment by Japan shows that it accepts the ROC as a political entity international arena. Furthermore, the Japanese-Taiwanese relations, though unofficial, show the latter’s capacity to be a state by the international law.
The ROC Southeast Asia policy, or the “southward diplomacy”, is not less vital for the enhancement of Taiwan’s international status. The presence of overseas Chinese communities and complementary economic conditions lead to close ties between them. By 2003, the ROC had representative offices in 7 of 10 ASEAN nations.[30] Southeast Asia is Taiwan’s investment market, major sources of foreign workers, and, in the year 2000, fourth largest export market.[31] The vacation diplomacy in Southeast Asia has been quite successful. Lee Teng-hui in February 1994 made visits to the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. His reception by Thailand’s Head of State King Bhumibol Adulyadej and his consort Queen Sirikit and Speaker of the Parliament Marut Bunnak implied a state visit.[32] Lee was also warmly welcomed in Malaysia. When the PRC took Malaysia a task for entertaining Lee, the Malaysian Foreign Minister pointed out that the economic position of Taiwan could not be overlooked and that Malaysia reserved the right to engage in discussions and exchanges with Taiwan.[33] These relations shows that several Southeast Asian countries recognise Taiwan as a political entity in international community and that the ROC has had a capability to conduct its own foreign relations, one of the elements of statehood in the 1933 Convention.
In terms of Taiwan’s call for admission or readmission to international organisations, its leaders view that membership in these institutions serves as substitute for formal diplomatic contacts and/or help Taipei raise the level of acceptable contact with foreign governments. As one Taiwanese official states:
As far as political significance is concerned, membership in international organisations provides us with a channel for formal contacts with many important countries, and it has a very positive effect on raising our international status and increasing our substantive relations with other countries.[34]
The ROC has tried to join international organisations by using various names other than “The Republic of China” to bypass the sensitive issue and reaction from the PRC and by no longer insisting on the PRC’s expulsion from an institution as a condition of membership. Overall, it is quite successful. Taiwan resumed participation in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1988 under the name “Taipei China”. It was admitted to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991 under the title “Chinese, Taipei”. Since the early 1990s until its entry in 2001, the ROC tried to be admitted to GATT/WTO as the representative of “Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu”. According to the latest data, Taiwan is now a member of 18 intergovernmental organisations.[35] The ROC admission to these organisations, though under unofficial names, implies that it is a political entity in on the world stage, that it can conduct foreign relations by its own, and that, particularly in cases of WTO and APEC, it can avoid being isolated by international community in the era of protectionism and regional trading zones.[36]
Taiwan’s Attempts to Overcome International Isolation: Success and Failure
The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has been known since the late 1970s as ‘an economic giant, a diplomatic orphan’ because as its economy has grown, it has been diplomatically isolated by international community. As a result, the ROC government tried to overcome international isolation by declaring ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ in 1988. This article argues that pragmatic diplomacy has been partly successful in terms of making other countries acknowledge that Taiwan is a political entity and has a juridical capacity to be a state according to the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933. However, pragmatic diplomacy cannot make most countries that realise the PRC political and economic might accept Taiwan as an independent state.
Facing international isolation since the PRC admission to the United Nations in 1971 and the establishment of the U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations in 1979, the ROC government on Taiwan has tried to overcome the isolation. The 1973 declaration of ‘total diplomacy’[1] by then Premier Chiang Ching-guo became the foundation of ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ or ‘flexible diplomacy’ launched by then President Lee Teng-hui in 1988 that called for:
1. The advancement and reinforcement of formal diplomatic ties
2. The development of substantive relations with countries that do not maintain formal ties with Taiwan.
3. Admission or readmission to international organisations and activities vital to the country’s national interest.[2]
These three principles declared by Lee Teng-hui will be used in this article as criteria for assessing, first, the success and, later, the failure of Taiwan’s pragmatic or flexible diplomacy.
The success of pragmatic diplomacy
Considering the advancement and reinforcement of formal diplomatic ties, the ROC tries to use its economic might to sustain relations and gain recognition by giving economic aid to countries that have diplomatic relations with her. Most of these countries are developing countries in Central America, Africa, and Oceania which are attracted by the ROC ‘dollar diplomacy’. In addition, the ROC in the late 1980s decided that it no longer considers the battle with the PRC over diplomatic recognition as a zero-sum game. Therefore, it gave up the application of the ‘Hallstein Doctrine’[3] and accept a dual recognition by establishing its diplomatic relations with Grenada, a state that still maintained official ties with Beijing in 1988.[4] As then ROC foreign minister Federick Chien stated in 1992:
"…in China, there now exist two political entities—one mainland China and one Republic of China on Taiwan. And that is really the theoretical basis of pragmatic diplomacy. Within the nation of China, there two political entities and each entity should have the capability of conducting its own diplomacy. They should, each one, have its own place in the world community."[5]
Dollar diplomacy has been partly successful. The number of countries that recognise the ROC has increased from 21 countries in the late 1970s to 27 countries by 2003.[6] Although this is a small victory, it is important for the international status and statehood of the ROC. According to article 1 of the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933,[7] four qualifications of the state as a person of international law are (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) government; and (4) capacity to enter relations with other states. Using the Convention as criteria, the ROC can be a state in both Declaratory School, which argues that any entity that possesses all elements of a state is a state[8] and Constitutive School, which argues that such entity must be recognised by other states to qualify as a state,[9] because it has a permanent population of 22,749,838 million[10] who live in four islands, namely Formosa, the Pescadores, Mazu, and Jinmen, with the total area of 35,980 sq. km.[11] under the rule of the government at Taipei which has official ties and is recognised by 27 countries. In short, the ROC official relations with these countries, and also unofficial ties that will be mentioned later, imply that her capacity to be a state is present.
In respect of the development of substantive relations with countries that do not maintain formal ties with Taiwan, although the ROC has official relations with only 27 countries, it maintains economic, technological, and cultural relations with countries around the world. By 2003, the ROC has 90 representative offices, or virtual embassies, under the guise of various names in 58 countries and territories and, reciprocally, 46 countries that do not have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan have established 54 representative offices or visa issuing centres in Taiwan which implies that these countries recognise the ROC as a political entity in international arena.[12] In Europe, the EU Parliament and 18 European parliaments have established inter-parliamentary friendship groups with Taiwan’s parliament.[13] In order to strengthen relations, the ROC uses the so-called ‘vacation diplomacy’ in which senior ROC political leaders would travel to foreign countries and meet with foreign leaders under the guise of unofficial vacation trips. In addition, the treatment Taiwan receives from these countries implies that they accept Taiwan as a political entity, as proved by considering Taiwan’s substantial relations with two countries and one region, namely the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia.
For the ROC, the United States is important in terms of security and economy. Strategically, although the Cold War in Asia had ended in the mid-1970s and the United States severed its official ties with the ROC in December 1978, the United States is still Taiwan’s security guarantor under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act that obliges the U.S. to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability”.[14] Economically, bilateral trade volume between these two countries in 2000 was $59.9 billion, making Taiwan the seventh largest importer of U.S. products and its eighth largest trading partner overall.[15] The United States in 2000 and 2001 was also the second largest recipient of Taiwan’s outbound investment[16] and the second biggest export market of Taiwan’s goods.[17] Economic interests with Taiwan gave rise to the pro-Taiwan group in the Congress that pressures the government to upgrade existing ties with the ROC. The extent of its success has been seen since the early 1990s. The visit of then U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills in December 1992 became the first time that a cabinet-level official had visited Taiwan since 1979.[18] In April 1994, the House 369-0 and the Senate 97-1 votes to urge the Clinton administration to grant a visa to then President Lee Teng-hui to conduct his vacation diplomacy under the guise of visiting his alma mater, Cornell University.[19] In September 1994, Washington allowed Taipei to change the name of its virtual embassy from the Coordinating Council for North American Affairs to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office,[20] a name that gives a clue to the identity of the country it represents. American economic interests in the ROC spill over into enhancing Taiwan’s security. After debates on U.S. Taiwan policy in Republican Party during the 2000 presidential campaign, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in his testimony in 2001 confirmed that the “Six Assurances”[21], first outlined by the Reagan Administration in 1982, remain part of U.S. Taiwan policy.[22] President George W. Bush also exhibited his resolve to abide by the Taiwan Relations Act by stating that the U.S. will “help Taiwan defend herself”[23] and agreeing to sell Taiwan guided-missile destroyers, diesel powered submarines, and anti-submarine aircrafts.[24] In short, the visit by the U.S. cabinet-level official, the allowance for the ROC to change the name of the office in the United States, the issue of visa for Lee Teng-hui, though under Congressional pressure, and the confirmation of the “Six Assurances” by Colin Powell enhance the ROC security and status as a political entity, facilitate the ROC conduct of vacation diplomacy, and show Taiwan’s capability to conduct its own foreign relations, one of the four qualifications of the state according to the Montevideo Convention of 1933.
Japan is also important for Taiwan’s efforts to implement pragmatic diplomacy and expand its international space. Although, it cannot substantially offer Taiwan defense and foreign policy support, due to the postwar constraints and lack of official ties since 1972, and it is Taiwan’s rival for investment in China and Southeast Asia, Japan in 2002 is Taiwan’s largest imports partner and third largest exports partner[25] and a source of technological skills, capital goods, and intermediate products that is essential for Taiwan’s export industry.[26] Lee Teng-hui’s proficiency in Japanese led to the cultivation of his relationship with many Japanese and economic interests continues to solidify this connection. In May 1992, the Japanese government allowed Taiwan to change the name of its office in Japan from the Association of East Asian Relations to the Economic and Cultural Representative Office of Taipei,[27] giving a clue to the identity of the country. In 1994, then Vice-Premier Hsu Li-teh was the ROC highest ranking official who was invited by the Japanese government to attend the 12th Asian Games in Hiroshima.[28] The following year Ryutaro Hashimoto, the then Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry met his Taiwanese counterpart Chiang Ping-kun on an official basis.[29] The treatment by Japan shows that it accepts the ROC as a political entity international arena. Furthermore, the Japanese-Taiwanese relations, though unofficial, show the latter’s capacity to be a state by the international law.
The ROC Southeast Asia policy, or the “southward diplomacy”, is not less vital for the enhancement of Taiwan’s international status. The presence of overseas Chinese communities and complementary economic conditions lead to close ties between them. By 2003, the ROC had representative offices in 7 of 10 ASEAN nations.[30] Southeast Asia is Taiwan’s investment market, major sources of foreign workers, and, in the year 2000, fourth largest export market.[31] The vacation diplomacy in Southeast Asia has been quite successful. Lee Teng-hui in February 1994 made visits to the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. His reception by Thailand’s Head of State King Bhumibol Adulyadej and his consort Queen Sirikit and Speaker of the Parliament Marut Bunnak implied a state visit.[32] Lee was also warmly welcomed in Malaysia. When the PRC took Malaysia a task for entertaining Lee, the Malaysian Foreign Minister pointed out that the economic position of Taiwan could not be overlooked and that Malaysia reserved the right to engage in discussions and exchanges with Taiwan.[33] These relations shows that several Southeast Asian countries recognise Taiwan as a political entity in international community and that the ROC has had a capability to conduct its own foreign relations, one of the elements of statehood in the 1933 Convention.
In terms of Taiwan’s call for admission or readmission to international organisations, its leaders view that membership in these institutions serves as substitute for formal diplomatic contacts and/or help Taipei raise the level of acceptable contact with foreign governments. As one Taiwanese official states:
As far as political significance is concerned, membership in international organisations provides us with a channel for formal contacts with many important countries, and it has a very positive effect on raising our international status and increasing our substantive relations with other countries.[34]
The ROC has tried to join international organisations by using various names other than “The Republic of China” to bypass the sensitive issue and reaction from the PRC and by no longer insisting on the PRC’s expulsion from an institution as a condition of membership. Overall, it is quite successful. Taiwan resumed participation in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1988 under the name “Taipei China”. It was admitted to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991 under the title “Chinese, Taipei”. Since the early 1990s until its entry in 2001, the ROC tried to be admitted to GATT/WTO as the representative of “Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu”. According to the latest data, Taiwan is now a member of 18 intergovernmental organisations.[35] The ROC admission to these organisations, though under unofficial names, implies that it is a political entity in on the world stage, that it can conduct foreign relations by its own, and that, particularly in cases of WTO and APEC, it can avoid being isolated by international community in the era of protectionism and regional trading zones.[36]
In sum, it can be argued that the ROC pragmatic diplomacy was partly successful because it enhances Taiwan’s status by overcoming international isolation and by making the international community acknowledge that it was a political entity and that it has a capacity to enter relations with others countries, one of the elements of statehood in the 1933 Convention.
However, in international politics, power politics always prevails over international law. Belarus and Ukraine under Stalin’s reign of terror, for example, were non-state actors by international law but became the founding member states of the United Nations by great power politics. In contrast, the case of the ROC shows that it can be a state only in international law, not in international politics because the PRC never ceases to claim its sovereignty over Taiwan.
The failure of pragmatic diplomacy
Considering Taiwan’s formal diplomatic ties with 27 countries, although it seems that such kind of relations enhances its international status and reflects its juridical capability to be a state, these countries are poor and minor in international politics and thus cannot influence other countries to recognise the ROC. In other words, the political returns obtained from these countries fall far short of Taiwan’s aid investments in them.[37] In addition, these formal relations based on economic aid are fragile because once a better price is offered from the PRC, Taiwan’s official ties may be broken.[38] Economic might of the PRC has been increasing steadily. For example, it is possible that the PRC gave Papua New Guinea $5 million when its local currency plunged in 2000[39] to ensure that Port Moresby will not switch its official ties to Taipei again as it did for a few weeks in 1999. Moreover, in cases of Saudi Arabia and South Korea, political and security considerations sometimes prevail over economic interests. Saudi Arabia severed official ties with the ROC in 1990 because the PRC could offer it ballistic missiles.[40] After the PRC had supported South Korean admission to the United Nations in 1991, the latter, aiming to establish official ties with the PRC to gain the upper hand in dealing with North Korea, moved its embassy from Taipei to Beijing in the following year.
In respect of substantive relations with countries that do not have official ties with the ROC, the failure is that these countries are simply maximising commercial relations and very few expressed political relations or friendships,[41] and that, due to the PRC political and economic might, its assertion on sovereignty over Taiwan, and its rigid application of the Hallstein Doctrine, the world is unwilling to challenge her by recognising Taiwan as a sovereign state.
Considering the U.S.-ROC relations, although Taiwan views that “re-establishing official relations with the U.S. has always been the top priority of the Foreign Affairs Ministry,”[42] Washington whose interests with the PRC have been increasing never seems to return to pre-Nixon era or pursue two Chinas policy. During a meeting in Shanghai in 1998, then U.S. President Bill Clinton reaffirmed U.S. China policy by declaring the “Three Nos”: no support for Taiwan independence, no recognition for a separate Taiwan government, and no backing of Taiwan’s entry into international organisations.[43] When Lee Teng-hui said in 1999 that the PRC-Taiwanese relations should be on state-to-state basis, the U.S. government quickly made it clear that it did not support Lee’s statement and Washington skilfully used the issue as a way of signalling Beijing that they wanted to continue a constructive policy towards the PRC.[44] Even the present Bush Administration that, unlike Clinton, views the PRC as a ‘strategic competitor’ does not abandon Clinton’s Three Nos. As State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said: “we adhere to the one-China policy. It is a policy that we have told the Chinese government directly”.[45] Recently when Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian in August 2002 declared that “there are two states on the each side of the strait”[46] and planned to hold a referendum on the status of Taiwan in conjunction with the March 2004 presidential election, President George W. Bush at a joint press conference staged for visiting PRC Premier Wen Jiabao openly criticised Taiwan’s leader for his intention to unilaterally change the status quo.[47] It seems that U.S. interests with the PRC prevail over the U.S. recognition of the ROC as an independent state. “It was impossible to imagine America would go to war with China to protect its business interests in Taiwan or trade with the island”, said Thomas W. Robinson.[48] Taiwan’s efforts to gain support and recognition form Washington become futile.
For Japan, although many politicians have connections with Lee Teng-hui, the priority is given to the relations with the PRC, not Taiwan. Lee Teng-hui was not allowed to attend the Hiroshima Games in 1994. In July of that year, when the plane carrying Japanese Foreign Minister Kono to the APEC Summit in Bangkok had to land for four hours at Chiang Kai-shek international airport because of a typhoon, Kono did not left the plane.[49] Although Japan refused to declared the “Three Nos”, then Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi confirmed to then PRC President Jiang Zemin during the visit to Japan in November 1998 that “our stance of not supporting Taiwan’s independence remains unchanged”.[50] When Lee’s “state-to-state” PRC policy was announced, Obuchi quickly affirmed that Japan understands and respects Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is an alienable part of the PRC, and joined the U.S. and many other Asian countries in regarding Lee’s statement as regrettable and ill-advised.[51] During his trip to the PRC in July 1999, Obuchi stuck firmly to Japan’s stance of adhering to the 1972 joint statement stipulating that Japan recognises only “One China”.[52] “Tokyo’s preferred option for cross-Strait relations remains the continuation of the status quo. This will enable the Japanese to avoid hard choices and difficult decisions”, said Phil Deans.[53] It seems that there is no tendency for Japan to recognise Taiwan as a state.
Also for Southeast Asian nations, the priority is given to relations with the PRC. In 1994, then Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, facing pressure from the PRC, avoided a meeting with Lee-Teng-hui and sent his deputy instead.[54] During the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, no Southeast Asian nations, except Singapore, dared to urge caution on the PRC. Although some political figures, such as then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad and then Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in November 1997, made visits to Taiwan, these visits were very brief and driven by economic considerations rather than political ones. Recently, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong whose July 2004 visit to Taiwan angered the PRC announced after his inauguration a month later that Singapore would never recognise Taipei if it should declare independence.[55] As Leifer states:
The problem for Taiwan is that while it has made considerable advances in securing a quasi-diplomatic association with more important regional states on a bilateral basis, none of them, with regional security in mind, has been willing to offend the government in Beijing over the indivisible matter of sovereignty.[56]
In addition, pragmatic diplomacy has been incompatible with the ROC claims for sovereignty over the South China Sea. When in December 1988, for example, then ROC Defence Minister Cheng Wei-yuan was asked about Taiwan’s stance toward the PRC-Vietnamese armed clash in the Spratly Islands, he said that Taipei would stand side by side against Vietnam as the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait were Chinese.[57] “Such a statement was hardly in keeping with a pragmatic diplomacy aimed at encouraging governments in South-East Asia to lend greater recognition to the independent political identity of Taiwan”, said Leifer.[58] Leifer further argues that social incongruence in Southeast Asia, a legacy of colonial powers, makes all governments in the region oppose Taiwan’s independence because they believe that sovereignty is indivisible.[59]
In short, it is clear that Southeast Asian nations do not want to recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state.
In terms of Taiwan’s participation in international organisations, although the ROC has been admitted or readmitted to many institutions since the late 1980s, most of them are functional organisations which, in most cases, do not require statehood as a condition for membership. Since the early 1990s, the ROC, supported by few minor countries, has tried to urge the United Nations to “examine the exceptional international situation pertaining to the Republic of China on Taiwan, to ensure that the fundamental right of its 23 million people to participate in the work and activities of the UN is fully respected”.[60] However, the ROC has been unsuccessful in joining to the United Nations. If it could, its statehood will no longer be ambiguous because, according to the UN Charter, all members must be a state. The main obstacle is the PRC who has a veto power and see that Taiwan’s attempts are efforts to create two Chinas. PRC officials vow that “it is impossible for Taiwan to enter the United Nations under whatever name in whatever way” (italic as original).[61] Although John Bolton argued that the case of the ROC does not involve the Security Council or PRC veto power either because it is not an admission of a new state but a readmission of the former member[62] and Yahuda viewed that the PRC as the interested party should not be able to exercise its vote in the Security Council,[63] it is still unlikely that most representatives of the member states in the General Assembly realising the enormous cost and effect of antagonising the PRC would vote for the ROC.
Conclusion
After examining the ROC pragmatic diplomacy, it is likely that this kind of conduct is partly successful in overcoming international isolation and enhancing Taiwan’s status as an actor in international arena that has a capability to be a state by the 1933 Montevideo Convention. However, pragmatic diplomacy fails to the extent that it cannot change the PRC attitude toward Taiwan and thus most countries, realising the political and economic importance of the PRC, cannot afford to recognise the ROC, a sovereign state by international law, as a sovereign state in international politics.
[1]Total diplomacy called for the mobilization of all available resources, including political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and sports exchanges, to maintain or develop substantial links with states that had transferred diplomatic recognition to Beijing. See Michael Swaine and James Mulvenon, Taiwan’s Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and Determinants (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp.19.
[2] Dennis Van Vrankren Hickey, Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), pp. 115.
[3]The doctrine was first expressed by then foreign minister of Federal Republic of Germany Water Hallstein in 1955. It dictated that West Germany would sever official ties with any countries that recognised East Germany except the Soviet Union . See Francoise Mengin, “Given a Unique Model of Bilateral Relations, Can Taiwan Be an Actor on the World stage” in Contemporary China and Changing International Community, ed. Bih-jaw Lin (Taipei: Institute of International Relations: 1993), pp.149.
[4]Hickey, Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System, pp. 116. However, the PRC never accepts the dual recognition.
[5]Cited in ibid., pp. 117.
[6]ROC Yearbook 2003: available from http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/chpt08.htm ; accessed 31 October 2004. These are, alphabetically, Belize, Burkina Faso, Chad, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, The Gambia, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Tome and Principe, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tuvalu, and Vatican City.
[7]Known as the Montevideo Convention. Cited in Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, “All Dressed Up But Not Invited to the Party: Can Taiwan Join the United Nations Now the Cold War is Over?” in The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order: Legal and Political Consideration, ed., Jean- Marie Henchaerts (London: Kluwer Law International Ltd., 1996), pp. 94.
[8]Ibid., pp. 96.
[9]Ibid., pp. 96.
[10] CIA-World Factbook 2004, “Taiwan”; available from http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/print/tw.html ; accessed 31 October 2004.
[11] Ibid.
[12]ROC Yearbook 2003.
[13]Ibid.
[14]The ROC Yearbook 2002.
[15]Ibid.
[16]Ibid. and The ROC Yearbook 2003.
[17]The PRC is the largest recipient of Taiwan’s outbound investment and the biggest export market of Taiwan’s goods. Cited in CIA-World Factbook 2004.
[18] Hickey, Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System, pp. 120.
[19]Thomas Robinson, “America in Taiwan’s Post Cold-War Foreign Relations,” China Quarterly Vol.O, Issue 148 (December 1996): pp.1345.
[20]Hickey, Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System, pp. 120.
[21] The Six Assurances made clear that Washington had not agreed to set a date to end arms sales to Taiwan; had not agreed to consult the PRC government before selling weapons to the ROC; had not agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; had not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; would not mediate between Taiwan and the Mainland; and would not exert pressure on Taipei to enter into negotiations with Beijing. See Swaine and Mulvenon, pp.141.
[22]Ibid., pp.141.
[23]The ROC Yearbook 2002.
[24]Ibid.
[25]Taiwan’s two largest exports partners are the PRC and the United States. Cited in CIA-World Factbook 2004.
[26]Ralph N. Clough, “The Republic of China and the International Community in the 1990s” in Contemporary China and Changing International Community, pp.142.
[27]Hickey, Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System, pp. 120.
[28]Michael Yahuda, “The International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan,” China Quarterly Vol.O, Issue 148 (December 1996): pp.1330.
[29]Ibid.: pp.1330-1331.
[30]These are Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Cited in the ROC Yearbook 2003.
[31]CIA-The World Factbook 2002.
[32]Michael Leifer, “Taiwan and South-east Asia: The Limits to Pragmatic Diplomacy,” in Taiwan in the Twentieth Century: A Retrospective View, ed. Richard Louis Edmonds and Steven M. Goldstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
[33]Yahuda, pp.1334.
[34]Hickey, “Taiwan’s Return to International Organisations: Policies, Problems and Prospects,” in The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order: Legal and Political Consideration, pp. 70.
[35]The ROC Yearbook 2003.
[36]Hickey, “Taiwan’s Return to International Organisations: Policies, Problems and Prospects,” pp. 70.
[37]Gerald Chan, “Taiwan as an Emerging Foreign aid Donor: Developments, Problems, and Prospects,” Pacific Affairs Vol.70, Issue 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 56.
[38]Tuan Y. Cheng, “Foreign aid in ROC Diplomacy,” in Contemporary China and Changing International Community, pp. 179.
[39]Elizabeth Feizkhah, “Making Friends: Beijing is courting the island nations in the Pacific. Is it just extending a helping hand, trying to isolate archrival Taiwan – or getting ready to confront the U.S.,” available from http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/nations/0,8782,129537,00.html; accessed 22 January 2003.
[40]Kay Moller, “Does Flexible Diplomacy Improve Taiwan’s International Status,” in The International Status of Taiwan in the New World Order: Legal and Political Consideration, pp. 55.
[41]Linjun Wu, “Limitations and Prospects of Taiwan’s Informal Diplomacy,” in ibid., pp. 40.
[42]Hickey, Taiwan’s Security in the Changing International System, pp. 117.
[43]Swaine and Mulvenon, pp.139.
[44]Phil Deans, “A Democracy Craving for Recognition: A pessimistic view on the impact of democratization on Taiwan’s international status,” China Perspectives No.34 (March-April 2001), pp. 39.
[45]Swaine and Mulvenon, pp.142.
[46]Yun-han Chu, “Taiwan’s National Identity Politics and the Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations,” Asian Survey Vol. XLIV, No. 4 (July/August 2004), pp. 490.
[47]Ibid., pp. 490.
[48]Robinson, pp.1356.
[49]Deans, pp. 40.
[50]Swaine and Mulvenon, pp.145.
[51]Deans, pp. 41.
[52]Swaine and Mulvenon, pp.147.
[53]Deans, pp. 42.
[54]Moller, pp. 55-56.
[55]Barry Wain, “Lee at the Lectern,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 September 2004, pp. 11.
[56]Leifer, ibid.
[57]Ibid.
[58]Ibid.
[59]Ibid.
[60]The ROC Yearbook 2002.
[61]Hickey, “Taiwan’s Return to International Organisations: Policies, Problems and Prospects,” pp. 74.
[62]Cited in Wang, pp. 106-107.
[63]Yahuda, pp.1338.
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