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China’s Korea Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-1992, Chapter III, The Road to Normalisation (1990-1992)


China’s Korea Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-1992, Chapter III,
The Road to Normalisation (1990-1992)

From 1989 to 1991, the international system changed tremendously. The collapse of Eastern European bloc was followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union; bipolarity during the Cold War ended. Meanwhile, the unipolar world under U.S. hegemony was emerging. These changes, of course, affected China’s foreign policy direction. The chapter will show that the new international system made the strengthening of relations with peripheral states the focus of China’s foreign policy. In addition, as the collapse of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union signified the crisis of Communism, the Chinese leadership viewed that economic reform is the only way to uphold their legitimacy. Therefore, China in the early 1990s normalised its relations with its economic partner South Korea. However, the normalisation could not have happened unless China had made an understanding with North Korea.

The significance of the end of the Cold War
The end of the Cold War affected China’s international relations and Korea policy. During the 1970s-1980s, China was a U.S. de facto ally against the Soviet Union and thus enjoyed a central position in the “strategic triangle” vis-à-vis Washington. However, as the Cold War ended, Beijing’s strategic importance in the eyes of Washington lessened. Furthermore, the Sino-American relations deteriorated after the Tiananmen incident. The U.S. victory in the Gulf War also signalled the growing influence of the United States in world affairs. On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Beijing of its “Russian card” to play against Washington.[1] China’s view of unipolar world was negative. As David Shambaugh says:

"From the PRC’s perspective, the prospect of unipolarity was an alarming state of affairs far worse than bipolarity. Peking’s preferences is for a multipolar world in which regional powers, such as the PRC, play defining role in their regions and are able to resist external intervention and interference in international affairs."[2]

Therefore, China decided to find its place in the new international system by improving relations with its Asian neighbours, few of which officially criticised the Tiananmen incident. Michael B. Yahuda argues that this was the first time China developed truly regional policies.[3] At the beginning of the 1990s, in addressing the changing international situation and China’s foreign policy, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen wrote that China has now “attached special importance to developing closer relations with its neighbours, and thus articulating the dominant thrust of Chinese foreign policy in recent times.”[4] It must be noted that after the Tiananmen tragedy Premier Li Peng made his first official trip to Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Meanwhile, China established, or restored, or normalised its diplomatic relations with several neighbouring countries, such as Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam, Mongolia, and the newly-independent Central Asian Republics; and started its participation in ASEAN. As China must seek new sources of economic assistance to lessen its dependence on the United States, it is unlikely that South Korea did not loom large in China’s regionally-oriented foreign policy. In addition, the further opening of a Russian market to South Korea after the 1990 Soviet-South Korean normalisation stimulated China’s competitive instincts to seek the attention of South Korean business interests.[5] In short, by the early 1990s, the change in international relations led to the Asianisation of China’s foreign policy that favoured the development of the Sino-South Korean relations.

The Sino-South Korean relations from Tiananmen to normalisation
By the end of the 1980s, the Sino-South Korean unofficial relations became semi-official ones. Despite the Tiananmen incident, the Sino-South Korean economic relations increased steadily. China’s trade with South Korea reached over $3 billion in 1989, ten times bigger than that with North Korea.[6] By 1991, South Korea was China’s fifth-largest trade partner.[7] In order to normalise South Korea’s relations with China before leaving his office, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo not only refused to join the international campaign against China, but also provided assistance to China’s tourist industries which had been badly affected by the Tiananmen tragedy.[8] Both China and South Korea seized the opportunities offered by the Beijing Asian Games in September 1990 to improve their relations. Few weeks after the Asian Games, on October 1990, China and Seoul announced the establishment of trade offices in each other’s capitals. It must be noted that the South Korean trade office in Beijing was staffed by personnel from the ministry of Foreign Affairs and enjoyed diplomatic community.[9] In other words, it indicated that China had decided to shift its policy officially from one Korea to two Koreas.

Another major step toward China’s de jure two-Koreas policy was the admission of the two Koreas to the United Nations. During his visit to Pyongyang in May 1991, Premier Li Peng informed Kim Il Sung of the decision not to veto South Korea’s entry to the United Nations.[10] This decision led to the dual North-South admission to the UN. After that, the UN became a venue for Chinese and South Korean diplomats to contact each other. In September 1991, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met his South Korean counterpart Lee Sang Ock for the first time at the UN. Qian met Lee again in November 1991 when he attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference at Seoul. Lee explored the possibility of early diplomatic relations, but Qian said that conditions were not yet ripe.[11] However, in the wake of the APEC conference, there were four incidents that precipitated the establishment of the Sino-South Korean diplomatic relations.

The first event was the North-South talks in December 1991. The years 1990 and 1991 were bad years for North Korea and led to Kim Il Sung’s reconciliatory posture toward the South which in turn favoured China’s normalisation with Seoul. The reduction of Soviet aids, the Soviet demands for payments in hard currencies, and the Soviet-South Korean normalisation cost Kim Il Sung a crucial political, military, and economic benefactor and thus worsened economic problems. In addition, Kim’s remaining major ally, China, though assuring North Korea of its security commitment, was moving toward its normalisation with the South. Therefore, Kim realised that he had no choice but to reconcile with the South and the talks began in October 1991. Eventually, according to the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North signed at Seoul on December 13, 1991, both sides agreed to recognise each other’s political and social system, to transform the present state of armistice in to a solid state of peace, to abandon the use of force against each other, and to conduct economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges.[12] As North Korea pursued conciliatory approaches toward the South, China began to feel free to justify that South Korea deserve de jure recognition.

The second one was Deng’s southern tour in January 1992 which favoured the Sino-South Korean normalisation in that it signalled the end of rigid doctrinism imposed after the Tiananmen tragedy. Deng viewed that China’s political system was threatened by the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the prototype of Communism, in 1991 raised questions about legitimacy in the remaining Communist countries including China. Deng argued that the Soviet disintegration was largely the result of its economic failure.[13] In other words, he realised that it is no longer possible to maintain power by upholding a strictly Marxist-Leninist system and thus the future are tied to the economic reform. While economic modernisation may eventually threaten the CCP’s monopoly of power, there is no alternative but to place the hopes of sustaining itself in power on continuing to satisfy the demands of the masses through material success.[14] Thus, by the beginning of the 1990s, China resumed its reform which was halted in the wake of the Tiananmen incident. In March 1991, Shanghai’s Jiefang Ribao published an article entitled ‘Reform and Opening up Requires New Ideas’ prepared by Mayor of Shanghai Zhu Rongji with the backing of Deng Xiaoping.[15] On the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution in October 1991, Deng was quoted as saying:

"We should firmly stick to economic construction and continue along this path unless there is large scale foreign aggression. We should never divert our attention or allow undermining or interference in this central task."[16]

In January 1992, Deng Xiaoping made a historic tour to southern China and gave a green light to economic modernisation. Deng remarked:

"If China cannot rapidly develop its economy and gradually reduce the gap with Western countries and Asian NIEs, or even worse, if China’s economic reform fails as a result of political setback, stagnation, or hyperinflation, then the People’s Republic of China will definitely begin to slide into oblivion."[17]

Finally, Deng’s line defeated on March 10, 1992 when the enlarged Politburo resolved that the country should guard against turning “right” (i.e. into capitalism) but that even more importantly it should guard against turning “left” (i.e. to radical Communism).[18] This event precipitated the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and its regional economic partner South Korea.

In addition, foreign relations of China’s diplomatic rival, Taiwan, partly accelerated the Sino-South Korean normalisation. It is known that Taiwan has used “dollar diplomacy” to buy diplomatic recognition since the 1980s. In the wake of the Cold War, Taiwan tried to open relations with the newly-independent states. Taiwan’s dollar diplomacy seemed to be successful when it opened consular relations with Latvia in January 1992 and diplomatic ones with Niger in June of the same year. Therefore, China had to retaliate Taiwan by establish its diplomatic relations with South Korea, Taipei’s last diplomatic stronghold in Asia. Also, China was wary of Taiwan’s bid to (re)join the UN and the pro-independence Democratic Progress Party. China believed that the normalisation could bring the Taiwan authorities to the negotiating table because mutual commercial interest across the Taiwan Strait could be heightened if aggressive Korean entrepreneurs were further injected into competition with Taiwan in the Chinese market.[19] In other words, the Sino-South Korean normalisation further isolated Taiwan diplomatically and favoured China’s reunification.

Last but not least, the escalation of Sino-American trade disputes in 1992 partly accelerated the normalisation with Seoul. As U.S. trade deficits with China had risen from $6.235 billion in 1989 to $12.691 billion in 1991, on August 21, 1992, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) listed $3.9 billion worth of Chinese exports to the U.S. as a target of retaliation if market-access talks with Beijing were not successfully completed by an October 10 deadline.[20] Therefore, China must sign normalisation agreement with South Korea to show that it had alternative trade options to the Americans. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in a secret report to the CCP Central Committee Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group reportedly argued that the normalisation with Seoul would “down four birds with one stone”: increasing Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, expanding Beijing’s economic cooperation with Seoul, diminishing Pyongyang’s seemingly endless requests for aid, and defusing pressure from the United States concerning unfair trade practices.[21]

The talks on normalisation began in April 1992 and ended with the signing of a joint communiqué on the establishment of Sino-South Korean diplomatic relations by Qian Qichen and Lee Sang Ock at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing on August 24, 1992. China’s de facto two-Koreas policy was eventually changed to de jure one. Few weeks later, President Roh Tae Woo made a state visit to China.

As having been mentioned so far, China’s decision to have relations with South Korea was based chiefly on economic reasons. However, China tried to make sure that the search for economic security must not be conducted at the expense of military and political security. Russell Ong argues that China in the post-Cold War era has searched for “comprehensive security” which includes military, political, economic, scientific and technological, and social security as its elements.[22] Therefore, as mentioned in the previous chapter that North Korea is still politically and strategically important for China in the post-Cold War era, China had to make sure that Pyongyang would not be antagonised by the Sino-South Korean normalisation.


Chinese diplomacy toward North Korea during the process of normalisation
Unlike the Soviet Union during its normalisation with Seoul in 1990, China, respecting North Korea’s sensibilities, negotiated the normalisation with South Korea in secrecy, kept North Korea informed of the process, and assured Kim Il Sung of China’s commitment. It also raised Kim Il Sung’s profile. In April 1992, while Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was holding a meeting with his South Korean counterpart, Lee Sang Ock, in Beijing, President Yang Shangkun visited Pyongyang to participate in the gala celebration for Kim Il Sung’s eightieth birthday. Chae-Jin Lee views that for the Chinese who do not publicly celebrate Deng Xiaoping’s birthday it was a gesture designed to boost Kim’s beleaguered position in the international community.[23] In addition, China made Kim understand that the normalisation would benefit North Korea as well. In June 1992, Qian Qichen made a secret trip to Pyongyang and explained to Kim Il Sung that China’s diplomatic relations with South Korea would help North Korea’s diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States, stabilise the Korean peninsula, and contribute to North Korea’s system maintenance.[24] Realising that he could no longer enjoy playing a “Soviet card” against China and that China is North Korea’s only major security and economic provider in the post-Cold War era, Kim Il Sung expressed his understanding, if not acceptance, of China’s decision on South Korea.[25] On the day China normalised its relations with South Korea, in order to reassure its commitment to North Korea, a “goodwill” delegation representing the Chinese People’s Liberation Army visited Pyongyang.[26] China’s diplomacy toward Pyongyang during the process of normalisation implied the importance of North Korea to China in the post-normalisation period.

[1]Xiaoxiong Yi, “China’s Korea Policy: From “One Koreas” to “Two Koreas,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, no. 2 (1995): 121.
[2]David Shambaugh, “Peking’s Foreign Policy Conundrum Since Tienanmen: Peaceful Coexistence vs. Peaceful Evolution,” Issues & Studies 28 (November 1992): 70.
[3]Michael B. Yahuda, The International Politics of Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London: Routledge, 1996), 211.
[4]Xiaoxiong Yi, “China’s Korea Policy: From “One Koreas” to “Two Koreas,” : 121.
[5]Hong Liu, “The Sino-South Korean Normalization: A Triangular Explanation,” Asian Survey 33 (November 1993), 1084-1085.
[6]Hong Yung Lee, “Future Dynamics in Sino-Korea Relations,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 9 (Fall 1990): 34-49, [journal on-line] ; available from http://weblinks1.epnet.com/delivery.asp?tb=0&_ug=dbs+0+In+en-us+sid+... ; accessed 1 April 2003.
[7]Hong Yung Lee, “China and the Two Koreas: New Emerging Triangle,” in Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War, ed. Young Whan Kihl (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 105.
[8]Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: dynamic relations (Standford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1996), 150.
[9]Hong Yung Lee, “Future Dynamics in Sino-Korea Relations,”: 33-49.
[10]Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 243-244.
[11]Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: dynamic relations, 123.
[12]Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, 262.
[13]Wei-Wei Zhang, Ideology and Economic Reform under Deng Xiaoping 1978-1993 (London: Kegan Paul International, 1996), 182.
[14]Russell Ong, China’s Security Interests in the Post-Cold War Era (London: Curzon, 2002), 51.
[15]Wei-Wei Zhang, Ideology and Economic Reform under Deng Xiaoping, 184.
[16]Cited in ibid., 182.
[17]Cited in Xiaoxiong Yi, “China’s Korea Policy: From “One Koreas” to “Two Koreas,”: 121.
[18]Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 946.
[19]Hong Liu, “The Sino-South Korean Normalization: A Triangular Explanation,”: 1090.
[20] Ibid.: 1086; and I.C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 6th ed., 962.
[21]Samuel S. Kim, “The Making of China’s Korea Policy in the Era of Reform” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 382.
[22]Russell Ong, China’s Security Interests in the Post-Cold War Era, 18.
[23]Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: dynamic relations, 91.
[24]Ibid., 125.
[25]Ibid., 125.
[26]Seongji Woo, “Adversarial Engagement and Alliance Relations: Triangular Politics on the Korean Peninsula, 1988-94,” Issues & Studies 37 (March/April 2001): 130.

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